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HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH. Edited by
Gerhard Loewenberg, 1 Samuel C. Patterson,z and Malcolm E.
Jewell.3 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985.
Pp. 810. $32.50.
Philip P. Frickey4
Handbook of Legislative Research is a new collection of review
essays assessing the state of political science research concerning
legislatures. Many law professors will find it a handy compendium
of information.
The editors, all respected political scientists, label their collection an "inventory of research." Part I, dealing with legislators and
constituencies, addresses legislative recruitment and careers, therelationship between electoral outcomes and responsiveness to constituents, and a more general overview of the role and
responsiveness of legislators. Part II, which concerns legislative organization and leadership, contains articles about the roles of parties and factions in legislatures, the committee assignment process,
legislative leadership, legislative staffs, and legislative organization
and rules. Part III, on legislative processes, examines standing
committees; legislative voting; the legislature's relationship with
and oversight of the executive branch; the supposed "iron triangle"
of legislative committees, administrative agencies, and interest
groups; legislative shaping of policies and budgets; and the utility of
abstract models of the political process growing out of public choice
theory. Finally, part IV presents some historical and comparative
perspectives.
For law professors, the value of this book might not be readily
apparent. In fact, however, public law theorists should find the
work of substantial importance. Legal realism properly counsels
the legal scholar to craft public law theory in light of realistic assumptions about the political process. In recent times legal scholars
have not been hesitatant to undertake this burden. Public law
scholarship fairly abounds with writings proposing some adjustment of public law in light of empirical realities. Consider a few
examples. A legal scholar who believes that administrative agencies
tend to be captured by the interests they are supposed to regulate
I.

Iowa.
2.
3.
4.
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might propose that courts enforce a nondelegation doctrine.s A
legal scholar who concludes that interest groups dominate legislative decisionmaking might counsel courts to strike down statutes
that embody deals that promote the private interests of powerful
groups rather than public values.6 Another legal scholar of a similar empirical but different jurisprudential bent might see the judge's
role as an agent of the legislature who must sanction-and perhaps
even promote-whatever deals among groups are ratified by the legislature in the form of a statute. 1
Legal scholars should not instantly modify public law theory in
light of the latest nuances in economic modeling or empirical findings. Yet public law theory cannot be divorced from an understanding, partial and tentative though it may be, of the institutional
qualities of legislatures and administrative agencies. In addition, we
all make countless generalizations about the political process in our
legal scholarship and teaching. These frequently appear to be based
more on seat-of-the-pants guesswork or ideology than on careful reflection upon the understandings of our compatriots across the campus in the departments of political science, sociology, economics,
and so on. The publication of Handbook of Legislative Research
thus provides the law professor with easy access to important
information. s
I cannot speak directly to the needs of scholars other than law
professors. Many political scientists who teach courses in constitutional law, judicial behavior, and legal philosophy may well have a
contemporary appreciation of legislative processes, interest group
politics, and so on. I would think, however, that Handbook of Legislative Research would still be a convenient and handy resource for
them, if they consider its contents significant for their courses. As a
consumer of an undergraduate constitutional law course in the early
1970's, I remember studying game theory and a variety of other
5. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1684-87, 1693·97 (1975) (concluding that reviving the nondelegation doctrine is
unlikely to improve administrative law substantially).
6. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
7. See Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-17,
45-48 (1984).
8. The book will be valuable to law students as well. It is no secret that law students
who lack a social science background sometimes find constitutional law, administrative law,
legislation, and other public law courses extraordinarily frustrating. In addition, their fellow
law students who have that background often have difficulty relating social science to public
law theory. William N. Eskridge and I are preparing materials for a course in legislation that
attack these problems. Unlike Handbook of Legislative Studies, our materials are introductory and suggestive rather than comprehensive. The student who wishes a richer overview of
particular topics now has a ready resource in that book, which is admittedly too dense for
quick consumption by novices.
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topics in the context of Supreme Court decisionmaking. I do not
recall spending much time on subjects I now consider more central
to constitutional law: for example, the comparative competence of
courts, legislatures, and agencies to handle some aspect or another
of public policy; strategies of judicial intervention into politics; and
devices that might promote a lawmaking partnership between
courts and legislatures based on greater cooperation and less antagonism. If these topics are stressed in political science courses in the
1980's, Handbook of Legislative Research should enhance the effort;
if they are not, the publication of this book removes any excuse
based on the difficulty of ascertaining the state of the art in legislative research.
The reader of Handbook of Legislative Research will find one
dominant message between its covers-a pessimistic view of the
ability of contemporary political science to explain legislative
processes and to predict legislative outcomes. Part of the problem
seems to be the nonreplicative nature of the methodology of some
studies. Case studies are one common method of political science
inquiry, and though useful they usually do not lend themselves to
the creation of meaningful theories. Overall, Handbook of Legislative Research reinforces the generalization that political science has
created "good descriptive information about how certain legislatures work, [but only] a very limited set of theoretical propositions
that can help to explain these workings. "9
Consider a question of major concern both to political scientists and to public law theorists: the degree to which interest groups
influence political outcomes. One searches in vain in Handbook of
Legislative Research for concrete conclusions on this subject. As
two social scientists recently stated, "[T]he realm of organized interest politics is so vast--encompassing so many different kinds of
organizations and so many different avenues of influence-that it is
possible to locate an example to illustrate virtually any reasonable
generalization one might put forward."10 Any public law theory
based in part upon even plausible empirical generalizations about
interest group politics is always subject to challenge by theorists
who find different empirical generalizations more plausible. Political science provides no easy way to resolve these disputes.
Competing with political science for the attention of the law
professor is public choice theory. By applying the methodology and
9. Ferejohn & Fiorina, Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior, 65 AM. EcoN. REv.
407 (1975).
10. K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY xiii (1986).

580

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 3:577

assumptions of economies to political science-that is, by formulating abstract models for predicting leg;slative outcomes based on the
assumption that people are egoistic, rational, utility maximizerstt_
public choice theorists have developed sophisticated and intriguing
models of the legislative process. These models readily generate
predictions~f unfortunately doubtful accuracy. Indeed, the essay
in Handbook of Legislative Research by William H. Panning
presents a largely critical overview of "formal models" and suggests
that, at least in their most abstract forms, they are fundamentally
misguided.
I would have liked to have seen more discussion of public
choice theory in Handbook of Legislative Research. The Panning
essay is an extremely thoughtful and useful overview of formal
models and their problems, but it may embody too much of the
traditional political science perspective.t2 Moreover, with few exceptions, the other essays focus on traditional political science studies, with little attention paid to studies using public choice
methodology.
In some instances this omission seems particularly unfortunate.
For example, the essay concerning voting behavior by legislators-a
subject about which public choice theory ought to have a good deal
to say-notes "studies of voting behavior cast in the framework of
axiomatic theory," states that a "synthesis of the axiomatic research
and the more behaviorally oriented research on legislative voting
would no doubt be informative," but nonetheless concludes that
such a discussion "is beyond the scope of this article." In context, it
is unclear whether the author reached this conclusion on her own or
had marching orders from the editors. In either event, I think
II. See, e.g., D. MuELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). Illustratively, consider Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups/or Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 37172 (1983):
The economic approach to political behavior assumes that actual political
choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own
interests ....
Individuals belong to particular groups-defined by occupation, industry, income, geography, age, and other characteristics-that are assumed to use political
influence to enhance the well-being of their members. Competition among these
pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium structure of taxes,
subsidies, and other political favors.
Political influence is not simply fixed by the political process, but can be expanded by expenditures of time and money on campaign contributions, political
advertising, and in other ways that exert political pressure. Political equilibrium
has the property that all groups maximize their incomes by spending their optimal
amount on political pressure, given the productivity of their expenditures, and the
behavior of other groups.
12. I cannot pretend to pocess the expertise to assess this potential criticism fully. Panning's essay comports, by and large, with my own perceptions of the limited utility of abstract
modeling.
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Handbook on Legislative Research is made weaker by the omission.
Stereotypic criticisms based on "the ad hoc empiricism and casual
theorizing of conventional political science"t3 are fostered by such
refusals to broaden the inquiry.
Some social scientists are attempting to build bridges between
public choice theory and traditional political science.t4 Panning's
essay in Handbook of Legislative Research praises these developments. In the main, however, the other authors of this compedium
miss the opportunity to suggest methods of integrating the two disciplines in future studies of the topics of their overview essays.
Although comprehensive only within the world of political science, Handbook of Legislative Research is a publication of significance to the legal academic community. If consulted, it should
promote a public law theory less fettered by inadequate, or stereotypic, or ideologically loaded perceptions of the political process.
Of course, even it is dated upon publication. For example, it was
prepared before the release, in early 1986, of the first comprehensive
study of interest groups in the American political system in over
twenty years.ts Handbook of Legislative Research in no way
reduces the obligation of public law theorists to remain current
about the understandings of social science, but it certainly makes
that task easier.
Now, if reputable scholars would only create a Handbook of
Public Choice Theory, to give us an overview of abstract modeling of
political processes, and then publish a third volume collecting efforts to integrate the viewpoint of the first two handbooks, public
law theorists would find it convenient to be trinitarian rather than
unitarian in their social science samplings. Of course, even if that
millenium arrives we would face a much more difficult endeavor:
figuring out what to make (and what not to make) of that
information.t6
13. Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives, 28 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 185, 200 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEG. STUD. Q. 5
(1985).
15. SeeK. SCHLOZMAN & 1. TIERNEY, supra note 10.
16. For a more comprehensive discussion of theories of legislative behavior and their
relationship to public law, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice 65 TEX.
L. REV.- (1986) (forthcoming).

